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ABSTRACT—Many disabled students exercise their First Amendment right
to choose to attend a private religious school only to learn that the school
will not provide reasonable accommodations crucial to their academic
success. Because private religious schools are exempt from Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and its reasonable accommodation mandate,
disabled students that choose such schools may be forced to find a more
welcoming learning environment elsewhere. As a result, disabled students
are currently unable to enjoy their Free Exercise Clause right to choose to
enroll in their ideal private religious schools to the same extent as their
nonhandicapped peers.
This inequality can be reduced by an expansive application of the
Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which is known as the Rehab Act and
covers entities that receive federal financial assistance. The Rehab Act is a
key statute for disabled students in private religious schools since there is no
religious exemption from its requirement that reasonable accommodations
be made for the disabled. However, the Rehab Act will achieve maximum
potency only if private religious schools that hold tax-exempt status, or
indirectly benefit from federal programs via a parent entity, are classified as
recipients of federal financial assistance for Rehab Act purposes. Also, a
Rehab Act regulation that allows private religious schools to charge disabled
students for reasonable accommodations should be limited so cost-shifting
is only possible if the school genuinely cannot afford the accommodations at
issue. And this approach to the problems disabled students face at private
religious schools would not infringe upon these schools’ First Amendment
right to the free exercise of religion.
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INTRODUCTION
Private religious schools are a popular educational option in the United
States. 1 In 2015, almost four million Americans attended over 23,000
religious elementary or secondary schools,2 while approximately two million
students were enrolled in 883 religious colleges.3 Parents and children select
religious schools for many reasons, 4 and the right to choose a religious
education is protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.5
But the unwillingness of some private religious schools to provide
reasonable accommodations deprives disabled students of opportunities to
attend such schools.6 Lobbying efforts by religious groups ensured that the
1
See STEPHEN P. BROUGHMAN, ADAM RETTIG & JENNIFER PETERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2015–16 PRIVATE
SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY 2 (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2017/2017073.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PAJ7-9YA9] (reporting that sixty-seven percent of private schools had a “religious orientation or
purpose”).
2
Id. at 6 tbl.1, 7 tbl.2 (showing that of the 4.9 million students who attended private schools in 2015,
1.07 million attended 11,304 nonsectarian schools, while 3.83 million attended 23,272 religious schools).
3
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS TABLE
303.90 (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_303.90.asp [https://perma.cc/Z9M5W8Y4].
4
These reasons may be academic, financial, social, or religious. See Five Reasons Why Parents
Choose a Catholic School Education, MONTEREY BAY PARENT, https://www.montereybayparent.com/
articles/education/five-reasons-why-parents-choose-a-catholic-school-education
[https://perma.cc/2ZDM-RR5H].
5
Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 49 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[T]here is no question that the Free
Exercise Clause ensures that . . . all Americans[] are free to opt for a religious education for their children
if they wish.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (restricting Congress from making any law prohibiting the
free exercise of religion).
6
See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., No. Civ.A.04-4647, 2005 WL 289929, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2005), vacated and remanded, 480 F.3d 252, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2007) (indicating that a
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reasonable accommodation requirement incorporated into Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)7 does not apply to private religious
schools.8 As such, some disabled students are forced to find more welcoming
educational settings elsewhere. 9 It is ironic that certain private religious
schools—themselves protected under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause—effectively deprive disabled students of their First Amendment
right to choose a religious education.
Two examples illustrate the ongoing issue of some private religious
schools’ refusal to make reasonable accommodations for disabled students.10
First, in 2005, a former student sued the Abington Friends School, a private
Quaker school located in suburban Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for failing to
reasonably accommodate his attention-deficit disorder and other learning
disabilities.11 The student also contended that Abington Friends School staff
engaged in disability discrimination in the form of physical discipline, public
humiliation, and an orchestrated campaign to force him to withdraw from the
school.12 The Third Circuit remanded the case to allow the student to conduct
discovery to support his claim.13 Second, in 2013, Michael Argenyi, a deaf
medical student, sued Creighton University, a private Jesuit school in
Omaha, Nebraska, when it refused to provide reasonable accommodations in
the form of cued speech interpreters and real-time captioning of lectures—
otherwise known as communication access real-time translation (CART).14
Creighton’s resistance forced Argenyi to take out about $114,000 in personal
loans over two years to pay for the interpreting and CART services that he
private Quaker school’s refusal to accommodate a student’s disabilities contributed to the student leaving
the school); accord Della Hasselle, Family Sues New Orleans Catholic Schools, Says Child with
Disability Denied Entry, NOLA.COM (Dec. 5, 2020, 3:02 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/coronavirus/
article_e74b6ec0-2f59-11eb-a9a2-77043325dbfa.html [https://perma.cc/6HPK-SGKB] (alleging that
two private Roman Catholic schools in New Orleans, Louisiana discriminated against a wheelchair-bound
student with cerebral palsy by refusing to allow her aide to accompany her during the school day); Tamara
Le, My Turn: Fighting ‘Ableism’ in Private and Religious Schools, CONCORD MONITOR (Dec. 1, 2019,
6:15 AM), https://www.concordmonitor.com/Ableism-30839392 [https://perma.cc/M8J2-DYBL]
(“Currently over 90% of New Hampshire’s K-12 private and religious schools lack an anti-discrimination
provision in their institution’s admission policy for students who experience a disability. Any disability.
Physical, medical, genetic, emotional, learning. Over 90%.”).
7
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
8
See Shannon Dingle, Resisting Ableism in the American Church, SOJOURNERS (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://sojo.net/articles/resisting-ableism-american-church [https://perma.cc/6GNP-UDJ5].
9
See supra note 6.
10
See, e.g., Hasselle, supra note 6 (discussing a student’s lawsuit against two private schools in New
Orleans, Louisiana, which alleged that the schools refused to reasonably accommodate her cerebral palsy
and need for a wheelchair).
11
Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d at 253–54.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 259.
14
Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 444–45 (8th Cir. 2013).
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needed.15 The court concluded that there was “a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Creighton denied Argenyi an equal opportunity to gain the
same benefit from medical school as his nondisabled peers by refusing to
provide his requested accommodations.”16
This Essay addresses the fact that disabled students cannot always enjoy
their First Amendment right to choose a religious education to the same
extent as their nonhandicapped peers and argues that federal law may oblige
such schools to provide reasonable accommodations. Part I sets out the
legislation relevant to this issue. Part II explains that if a private religious
school does not accommodate a disabled student, courts must first ask
whether the school is truly religious. This is a crucial threshold question
because if it is answered in the negative, the offending private school is a
secular entity and thus subject to Title III of the ADA.17 Part III lays out a
possible legal solution for cases where a bona fide private religious school
refuses to accommodate its disabled students. Although the ADA and
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)18 are ineffective in such
situations,19 an expansive application of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act
(Rehab Act)20 may be the best means of helping disabled students obtain
reasonable accommodations while attending private religious schools as they
progress from prekindergarten classrooms to higher education settings. Part
IV concludes by proposing a series of amendments to the ADA and Rehab
Act that would help protect disabled students’ access to private religious
schools by solidifying and filling the current gaps in these disability-focused
civil rights laws.

15

Id. at 445. It is unclear why Creighton did not raise the religious exception to Title III of the ADA
in this case, which may have been dispositive given Creighton’s Jesuit character. The Jesuits, also called
the Society of Jesus, are a Catholic religious order that operates private religious schools, which adhere
to a fixed set of religious and moral values, around the world. See What Is a Jesuit Education?,
CREIGHTON UNIV., https://www.creighton.edu/about/what-jesuit-education [https://perma.cc/K9T7RJTF].
16
Argenyi, 703 F.3d at 451.
17
See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 153 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The Baldwin
School is a private college preparatory school. Like other private schools, it is covered by Title III of the
ADA . . . .”); DOJ, ADA TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § III-1.5000, https://www.ada.gov/
taman3.html [https://perma.cc/982E-ZZ4F] (confining exceptions from Title III of the ADA to religious
entities).
18
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482.
19
As mentioned earlier in this Essay, the ADA’s reasonable accommodation requirement does not
apply to private religious schools. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187. In addition, IDEA is implemented by public
school districts, which are not always required to ensure the availability of reasonable accommodations
at private religious schools. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i).
20
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797b.

174

116:171 (2021)

Unlocking Accommodations in Private Religious Schools

I.

RELEVANT LEGISLATION

Three federal statutes—Title III of the ADA, the Rehab Act, and
IDEA—apply to students with disabilities. 21 Although there are crucial
differences between ADA’s Title III and the Rehab Act, the statutes impose
identical substantive duties. 22 Both statutes require schools—preschools
through colleges—to offer reasonable accommodations if a student has a
known disability. 23 Effectiveness is the hallmark of reasonable
accommodations. 24 Accommodations do not need to be perfect or fit a
student’s preferences, but they must be effective 25 in the sense that they
accommodate the limitations generally associated with a given disability.26
The reasonableness of an accommodation is a fact-sensitive issue analyzed
on a case-by-case basis. 27 IDEA, on the other hand, serves a different
purpose, as it ensures all disabled students have access to a free appropriate
public education in elementary and secondary school.28 School districts in
which disabled students reside must implement IDEA, and this obligation
persists even if a student opts to enroll in a private school.29
II. IS IT ACTUALLY A RELIGIOUS SCHOOL?
In cases where disabled students sue their private religious schools for
not implementing reasonable accommodations, the schools tend to highlight
21

For a discussion of laws applicable to disabled students, see A Comparison of ADA, IDEA, and
Section 504, MID-ATLANTIC ADA CTR., https://schoolnursing101.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ACOMPARISON-of-ADA-IDEA-504.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D8Q-XKQC].
22
Berardelli ex rel. M.B. v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 114–17 (3d Cir. 2018).
As explained below, there are two key differences between Title III of the ADA and the Rehab Act. First,
private religious schools are not exempt from the Rehab Act, while they are exempt from Title III of the
ADA. Second, unlike Title III of the ADA, the Rehab Act is only applicable to entities that participate in
a program or activity that receives federal funds; this definition covers some private religious schools,
thus obligating them to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled students. Infra Part II, Section
III.B.
23
42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
24
Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 189 (2d Cir. 2015).
25
Id.
26
Noll v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 787 F.3d 89, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002)) (explaining that “[a]n ineffective ‘modification’ or ‘adjustment’ will
not accommodate a disabled individual’s limitations,” and “the law requires an effective accommodation,
not the one that is most effective for each employee”).
27
Dean, 804 F.3d at 189.
28
J.T. v. District of Columbia, 496 F. Supp. 3d 190, 199 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(d)(1)(A)).
29
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3–4, 13–14 (1993) (holding that the
Establishment Clause does not bar private religious schools from providing publicly funded
accommodations because IDEA “creates a neutral government program dispensing aid . . . to individual
handicapped children”); Bellflower Unified Sch. Dist. v. Lua ex rel. K.L., 832 F. App’x 493, 495–96 (9th
Cir. 2020).
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their religious character and seek dismissal or summary judgment on grounds
that Title III of the ADA does not apply to them.30 Some private religious
schools have in fact avoided reasonably accommodating disabled students
by arguing that the schools are religious in nature. 31 However, before
granting such requests, courts should, as a preliminary matter, ask if the
school is really religious in nature. 32 If the school is truly religious in
character, Title III of the ADA is immaterial, and the school has “no
obligations under the ADA.”33 If not, the school is a secular institution that
must reasonably accommodate its disabled students under Title III of the
ADA.34
To this point, “religious schools” must be defined for ADA purposes.
Title III of the ADA exempts “religious organizations or entities controlled
by religious organizations.”35 But neither of these terms are defined,36 and
the relevant ADA regulations simply say this exception is “very broad,
encompassing a wide variety of situations.”37 For these reasons, one cannot
identify what exactly constitutes a religious school solely by parsing the
ADA and its regulations.
But federal courts have offered some guidance on this issue. Although
all religious and secular characteristics are relevant to whether an entity is

30
See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 254–55 (3d Cir. 2007)
(explaining that a private religious school’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit by a disabled student was based
on its religious nature and association with the Quakers); Sky R. ex rel. Angela R. v. Haddonfield Friends
Sch., No. 14-5730, 2016 WL 1260061, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2016) (highlighting that a private Quaker
school moved for summary judgment in a case involving a disabled student on the grounds that it was
exempt from the ADA); Spann ex rel. Hopkins v. Word of Faith Christian Ctr. Church, 589 F. Supp. 2d
759, 762–63 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (“Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is
exempt from coverage under Title III of the ADA as a religious private school that is controlled by a
religious organization, Word of Faith Christian Center Church.”).
31
See, e.g., Sky R., 2016 WL 1260061, at *7 (“As a private school with a religious affiliation with
the Religious Society of Friends (‘Quakers’) and under the control of the Haddonfield Monthly Meeting
(‘HMM’), [Haddonfield Friends School] is excluded from the ADA . . . .”).
32
See Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d at 258 (“Whether Abington [Friends School] qualifies for the
ADA’s religious exemption is a mixed question of law and fact, the answer to which depends, of course,
on the existence of a record sufficient to decide it.”).
33
White v. Denver Seminary, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173 (D. Colo. 2001).
34
See, e.g., Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 153 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The Baldwin
School is a private college preparatory school. Like other private schools, it is covered by Title III of the
ADA . . . .”).
35
42 U.S.C. § 12187.
36
See 42 U.S.C. § 12181.
37
28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. C § 36.104 (2020); see, e.g., Rose v. Cahee, 727 F. Supp. 2d 728, 748 (E.D.
Wis. 2010) (construing the ADA’s religious organization exception as including a Catholic healthcare
system).
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primarily religious, 38 key factors include the school’s “(1) ownership and
affiliation, (2) purpose, (3) faculty, (4) student body, (5) student activities,
and (6) curriculum.”39 Judges may also ask whether the school is a nonprofit
and has a formal religious presence within its management ranks or on its
board of trustees.40
The Ninth Circuit applied this test to the Kamehameha Schools, a group
of private schools in Hawai’i. 41 Although the Kamehameha Schools held
themselves out as Protestant, the court found that they were secular and
therefore could not benefit from religious exemptions set out in federal law.42
Here, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Kamehameha Schools: (1) were wholly
owned by the secular Bishop Trust; (2) had gradually shifted from a religious
purpose to a focus on secular principles; (3) enforced a Protestant-only rule
for on-campus teachers but did not require church membership or scrutinize
their religious beliefs, and of the 250 full-time faculty, only three had specific
religious teaching duties; (4) did not consider the religious affiliation of their
pupils, so only one-third of their 3,000 on-campus students were Protestant;
(5) sponsored many student activities, only some of which had mild religious
aspects; and (6) offered a largely secular curriculum that did not instruct their
students in Protestant doctrine and only contained a limited comparative
religious education requirement.43 The Ninth Circuit found that “[i]n sum,
the religious characteristics of the Schools consist of minimal, largely
comparative religious studies, scheduled prayers and services, quotation of
Bible verses in a school publication, and the employment of nominally
Protestant teachers for secular subjects.”44 This was insufficient to establish
a religious nature—the Ninth Circuit instead ruled that the Kamehameha
Schools were a “secular institution operating within an historical tradition
that includes Protestantism, and that the Schools’ purpose and character is
primarily secular, not religious.”45
This multifactor test can thus help ensure that private religious school
defendants in “failure-to-accommodate” lawsuits are genuinely entitled to
38
EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988) (illustrating that courts
use a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether an entity is genuinely religious and can thus
benefit from religious exemptions).
39
Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 727 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring)
(citing EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Est., 990 F.2d 458, 461–63 (9th Cir. 1993)).
40
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007); Kamehameha,
990 F.2d at 461; Townley, 859 F.2d at 618–19; EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 487 (5th Cir. 1980).
41
Kamehameha, 990 F.2d at 461–64.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 463.
45
Id. at 463–64.
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the religious exemption enumerated in Title III of the ADA. A less exacting
approach may give private schools that do not want to deal with perceived
hassles associated with disabled students a “get-out-of-jail-free” card: Assert
a religious purpose to avoid enrolling disabled students who initially appear
difficult to integrate into the student body.
III. RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND DISABLED STUDENTS
As noted above, Title III of the ADA is ineffective because a private
school that is truly religious in character is exempt from the requirement to
reasonably accommodate a disabled student. But disabled students can use
two other federal statutes to access the needed reasonable accommodations
while attending such schools. This Part addresses these alternative federal
statutes in four Sections. Section A argues that, although disabled K–12
students enrolled in private religious schools may be able to obtain services
from their local school district through IDEA, that statute is fraught with
shortcomings. Section B asserts that disabled students may instead be able
to secure reasonable accommodations through the Rehab Act, which applies
to all private schools that receive federal financial assistance.46 Because the
Rehab Act is broader than IDEA, an expansive application of the Rehab Act
could better help disabled students exercise their First Amendment right to
choose a religious education to the same extent as their nonhandicapped
peers. Section C highlights several First Amendment justifications for such
an application of the Rehab Act. Finally, Section D explores some policy
considerations which are relevant to disabled students’ access to reasonable
accommodations at private religious schools.
A. IDEA Is Ineffective in Its Current Form
IDEA guarantees all disabled elementary- and secondary-school
students access to a “free appropriate public education.”47 While IDEA can
be helpful, its scope is narrow. First, “IDEA is limited to educational
opportunities only through the academic level associated with completion of
secondary school.”48 As a result, IDEA is inapplicable to disabled college
and graduate students in its current form.
Second, IDEA allows public school districts to place disabled students
in private schools, which may occur when the school district feels that, for
some reason, the private school is better equipped to serve the student’s

46

29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.39(a), 104.41 (2020).
Z.B. v. District of Columbia, 888 F.3d 515, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1)(A)).
48
K.L. ex rel. L.L. v. R.I. Bd. of Educ., 907 F.3d 639, 643 (1st Cir. 2018).
47
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disability-related needs.49 But in such scenarios, the school district need only
make sure that its disabled students get “some educational benefit, meaning
a benefit that is more than minimal or trivial, from special instruction and
services.” 50 For example, in Board of Education v. Rowley, the Supreme
Court held that IDEA did not require a school district to provide a deaf
student a sign language interpreter because she was able to learn and perform
at an “adequate” academic level without an interpreter. 51 When a school
district places a disabled student into a private religious school, IDEA
promises only basic opportunities, not necessarily the services that would
fully unlock that student’s academic potential.52
Third, school districts that offer a free, appropriate public education
have no obligation to serve disabled students who independently decide to
enroll in a private religious school.53 Thus, only a narrow subset of students
with disabilities are protected under IDEA. Specifically, it is only when a
public school district itself places a student in a private religious school that
IDEA is applicable. Even then, students must settle for merely “adequate”
educational support. All other disabled students who are denied reasonable
accommodations by a private religious school must rely on different statutes
in order to access reasonable accommodations.
B. The Rehab Act May Be a Better Alternative
Although Title III of the ADA and IDEA are generally unhelpful to
disabled students deprived of reasonable accommodations while attending
private religious schools, the Rehab Act is a promising alternative. Section
504 of the Rehab Act forbids discrimination against disabled individuals by
participants in “any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”54 The Rehab Act lacks a religious exemption, so it covers all
49

See J.T. v. District of Columbia, 496 F. Supp. 3d 190, 200 (D.D.C. 2020); accord Ojai Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1473–78 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing summary judgment for a school
district in an IDEA case because a state hearing officer correctly concluded that the school district could
not provide a severely developmentally disabled student with a free appropriate public education as
evidenced by his inability to communicate in any language whatsoever and lack of self-help skills). The
court also ruled that the school district had to place the student in a specific private school recommended
by the hearing officer as especially well-positioned to meet the student’s needs. Id.
50
M.L. ex rel. Leiman v. Smith, 867 F.3d 487, 495 (4th Cir. 2017).
51
458 U.S. 176, 209–10 (1982).
52
In contrast, nondisabled students can easily access services needed to maximize their academic
potential, such as after-school tutoring sessions with their teachers—they need only ask, and they receive.
This point illustrates that formal educational policy strongly disfavors disabled students relative to their
nondisabled peers, and IDEA jurisprudence is such that schools and courts settle for adequate academic
achievement in the name of an “appropriate” education. See id.
53
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i).
54
Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
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private sectarian schools that benefit from direct or indirect federal financial
assistance.55
Federal financial assistance consists of direct subsidies and indirect
support received via intermediaries. 56 Indirect federal financial assistance
includes, among other things, childcare grants,57 free or reduced-cost school
lunches,58 and college tuition payments subsidized by federal student loans.59
Although there are some practical differences between direct and indirect
federal financial assistance,60 they are the same in the eyes of the law.61 As a
result, the type of federal financial assistance an entity receives has no impact
on its substantive obligations pursuant to the Rehab Act.62 The Rehab Act’s
applicability to religious entities, combined with the fact that “federal
financial assistance” includes both direct and indirect government aid, can
increase the availability of reasonable accommodations at private religious
schools under the Act. This will help disabled students enjoy their First
Amendment right to choose religious schooling.
The Rehab Act also provides concrete rights and remedies for disabled
students. Under the Rehab Act, a student can set out a prima facie failure-toaccommodate claim against a private religious school by stating that (1) the
student was disabled; (2) the school had notice of the student’s disability;
and (3) the school denied or ignored requests for reasonable
accommodations. 63 Furthermore, under the Rehab Act, private religious
schools cannot charge their disabled students for reasonable
accommodations unless these modifications cause a “substantial increase in
cost” for the school.64
But three things must happen for the Rehab Act to attain maximum
potency when applied to private religious schools. First, the scope of federal
55
John A. Liekweg, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504, and Church-Related
Institutions, 38 CATH. LAW. 87, 95–104 (1998); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.39(a), 104.41 (2020)
(describing the entities to which the Rehab Act applies).
56
U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 607 (1986).
57
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 666–67 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
58
See Liekweg, supra note 55, at 97.
59
Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 558, 563 (1984).
60
Practically speaking, direct federal financial assistance consists of funds that flow from the
government straight to recipients. In contrast, indirect federal financial assistance consists of funds that
the federal government provides to a recipient through an intermediary. See id. at 564–65.
61
Id. at 564.
62
Id.; accord Bentley v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 41 F.3d 600, 604 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 607 (1986)) (explaining that
Rehab Act “coverage extends to Congress’ intended recipient [of federal financial assistance], whether
receiving the aid directly or indirectly”).
63
Chenari v. George Washington Univ., 847 F.3d 740, 746–47 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
64
34 C.F.R. § 104.39(b) (2020).
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financial assistance for Rehab Act purposes should be expanded to include
federal tax exemptions available to religious groups. Second, if one or more
of a private religious school’s parent entities benefits from federal financial
assistance, that support should be imputed to the school in Rehab Act
contexts. Third, in deciding if a “substantial increase in cost” exists by virtue
of reasonable accommodations, courts should confirm a private religious
school’s inability to pay for such modifications before allowing the school
to seek reimbursement from disabled students.
1. Tax-Exempt Status as Federal Financial Assistance
Students who bring Rehab Act failure-to-accommodate claims against
private religious schools should first identify whether the school participates
in any federal programs that provide financial assistance, perhaps by filing a
Freedom of Information Act request with the Department of Education. 65
The Rehab Act and its reasonable accommodation mandate apply when a
private religious school accepts childcare grants, offers free or reduced-cost
lunches, or receives tuition payments subsidized by federal student loans.66
But private religious schools may forgo participation in such programs to
avoid unwelcome federal oversight.67
Nevertheless, tax-exempt status means that, for Rehab Act purposes, a
private religious school itself participates in a “program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.” An entity is eligible to receive federal tax
exemptions only if it undertakes specific charitable activities that serve a
valuable public purpose.68 Such a “tax exemption has much the same effect
as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay
on its income.”69 Supreme Court dicta signal that if these schools hold taxexempt status, they receive federal financial assistance and must reasonably
accommodate disabled students under the Rehab Act.70 For example, Justice
Clarence Thomas echoed this principle in a case that involved tax-exempt
religious entities. He emphasized that as “tax exemption in many cases is
economically and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary

65
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall . . . be excluded
from the participation in . . . activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
66
Supra notes 57–59.
67
See, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 559 (describing Grove City College’s decision
to refuse state and federal financial assistance in order to avoid federal oversight).
68
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 587–88, 591 (1983).
69
Regan v. Tax’n with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
70
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 666 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Regan, 461 U.S. at 544) (Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 859–60 & 859
n.4 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)) (“[T]ax exemptions . . . have ‘much the same effect as [cash
grants] . . . of the amount of tax [avoided].”).
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subsidy[,] . . . the financial aid to religious groups is undeniable.”71 Thus,
the fact that a private religious school holds tax-exempt status indicates that
it participates in activities receiving federal financial assistance. And because
these private religious schools receive federal financial assistance, the Rehab
Act compels them to reasonably accommodate their disabled students. This
classification of tax-exempt private religious schools reflects the federal
government’s ability to use its taxing power to combat discrimination that
contravenes established public policy.72
The above analysis meshes with judicial analysis of other civil rights
laws. The U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia and Southern
District of New York have held that tax exemptions are federal financial
assistance for purposes of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.73 The
former court based its ruling on the premise that, as tax-exempt status is
“available only to particular groups, it operates in fact as a subsidy in favor
of the particular activities these groups are pursuing.”74 And the Eleventh
Circuit has hinted that tax exemptions may be treated as federal financial
assistance in Title IX lawsuits.75 In so doing, this court noted that “exemption
from federal taxes produces the same result as a direct federal grant.”76 Since
Title VI, 77 Title IX, 78 and the Rehab Act 79 incorporate identical “federal
financial assistance” clauses, analyses of the first two statutes should apply
with equal force to the Rehab Act. A contrary approach would ignore this
fact to the detriment of disabled students’ First Amendment right to choose
to pursue a religious education.80
71

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 859–60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586, 604 (upholding the IRS’s decision to strip a racially
discriminatory private religious university of its tax-exempt status because such discrimination
contravenes congressional intent that tax-exempt institutions “serve a public purpose and not be contrary
to established public policy”).
73
Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 461–62 (D.D.C. 1972).
74
McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 462.
75
M.H.D. v. Westminster Schs., 172 F.3d 797, 802 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999).
76
Id.
77
42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
78
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); see M.H.D., 172 F.3d at 802 n.12 (noting that because Title VI served as a
model for Title IX, the rationale behind regarding tax-exempt status as federal assistance should apply in
both cases).
79
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
80
But see Johnny’s Icehouse, Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Ass’n of Ill., 134 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971–72
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that tax exemptions are not federal financial assistance for Title IX purposes
because the relevant regulation does not classify them as such); Bachman v. Am. Soc’y of Clinical
Pathologists, 577 F. Supp. 1257, 1263–65 (D.N.J. 1983) (holding that tax exemptions are not federal
financial assistance for Rehab Act purposes as they are comparable to “economic advantage[s]” afforded
by FCC broadcast licenses and government procurement contracts and because Rehab Act regulations
72
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In addition, treating tax-exempt status as federal financial assistance in
Rehab Act cases will also reflect the federal government’s license to use its
taxing power to fight discrimination. The Supreme Court outlined this
principle in its landmark Bob Jones University decision. 81 There, Justice
Warren Burger said that “entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting
certain common law standards of charity—namely, that an institution
seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary
to established public policy.”82 The Supreme Court then upheld the IRS’s
revocation of Bob Jones University’s federal tax exemption since it “would
be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant
the benefit of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational
entities”83 which contravene public policy.
Bob Jones University thus indicates that, by securing tax exemptions,
private religious schools subject themselves to federal antidiscrimination
policies.84 This principle applies to schools receiving tax exemptions under
the Rehab Act.85 And such schools should therefore be required to reasonably
accommodate disabled students. Otherwise, private religious schools will
enjoy the benefits of federal tax exemptions while avoiding the associated
antidiscrimination duties, such as reasonable accommodations for disabled
students. And classifying tax exemptions as federal financial assistance for
Rehab Act purposes is reasonable because private religious schools that truly
do not want to comply with that statute have an easy way out—forfeiting
their federal tax-exempt status. If a school is so inclined, it will free itself
from any obligation to reasonably accommodate disabled students and may
then turn away pupils who may be perceived as too difficult or expensive to
welcome into the school community.
Defining tax exemptions as federal financial assistance for Rehab Act
purposes is a key first step in securing disabled students’ First Amendment
right to choose to enroll in their preferred private religious schools. This
omit tax exemptions from the definition of federal financial assistance). Because the Supreme Court has
indicated that “tax exemptions . . . have ‘much the same effect as cash grants of the amount of tax
avoided,’” these district court rulings may not accurately reflect how other courts will analyze the issue
of whether tax exemptions are federal financial assistance for Rehab Act purposes in the future. See
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 666, 668 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (alterations
omitted) (explaining that whether a tax-exempt status may qualify as federal assistance is nuanced);
accord Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 859–60 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
81
See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (affirming the IRS’s decision
to strip a racially discriminatory religious university of its federal tax-exempt status).
82
Id. at 586.
83
Id. at 595.
84
See id. at 604–05.
85
Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 114–17 (3d Cir. 2018).
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approach to tax exemptions will help expand the Rehab Act’s scope to as
many private religious schools as possible, especially those that largely avoid
federal programs yet exploit tax exemptions. And these schools will be
unable to avoid their charitable and nondiscrimination duties to reasonably
accommodate disabled students, as any failure to do so could cost a school
its federal tax-exempt status. This analysis makes sense because federal tax
exemptions exist to facilitate essential public benefits including reasonable
accommodations for disabled students.86
2. Federal Financial Assistance for Parent Entities
Tax exemptions are only one part of the Rehab Act puzzle because
disabled students may attend private religious schools that avoid federal
programs and do not themselves hold tax-exempt status. But such schools
are not necessarily immune to the Rehab Act because they may possibly have
parent entities that should be part of the Rehab Act analysis. For example,
the Kamehameha Schools discussed earlier in this Essay are wholly owned
and controlled by a separate entity called the Bishop Trust, which engages
in a variety of activities throughout Hawai’i.87 In these cases, courts should
identify the school’s entire corporate structure, then ask whether any of its
parent entities obtain federal financial assistance via government programs
or tax exemptions, as the Middle District of Florida did in Schwarz v. The
Villages Charter School. 88 This approach would mirror the rule requiring
parties seeking to establish diversity jurisdiction for LLCs to allege the
citizenship of each member of every LLC implicated.89 And such an inquiry
is appropriate here because, much like LLC citizenship, the characteristics
of schools controlled by parent entities may be best defined by reference to
their parent entities. If a school’s parent entities receive federal financial
assistance, the school itself should be required to reasonably accommodate
disabled students under the Rehab Act.90
This parent entity-centric inquiry makes intuitive sense. The financial
assistance that a private religious school’s parent entities derive from federal
programs or tax-exempt status will naturally cascade down to the school,91
86

Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591.
EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Est., 990 F.2d 458, 461–63 (9th Cir. 1993).
88
See Schwarz v. Villages Charter Sch., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1189, 1202 (M.D. Fla. 2016)
(stating that a Rehab Act claim brought against a charter school survived summary judgment because
although that school did not receive federal financial assistance, one of its parent entities did, and this
support could be imputed to the charter school).
89
See Smith v. Toyota Motor Corp., 978 F.3d 280, 282 (5th Cir. 2020).
90
See Schwarz, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 1202.
91
See IRS, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2015),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBN9-N89H] (explaining that a parent
religious entity’s tax-exempt status automatically extends to all subsidiaries listed with the IRS).
87
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thus making the school an indirect recipient of federal financial assistance
subject to the Rehab Act.92 Rehab Act jurisprudence should reflect this key
aspect of multi-layered corporate structures. Otherwise, a private religious
school could evade the Rehab Act by funneling federal financial assistance
through a parent entity, thereby precluding disabled students from using the
Rehab Act to secure reasonable accommodations.
Religious interest groups will likely oppose the use of this “piercing the
corporate veil”-style test93 when private religious schools do not reasonably
accommodate a disabled student.94 They will probably cite the rule that the
Rehab Act does not extend to entities that do not directly or indirectly receive
federal financial assistance but merely derive downstream economic benefits
from such funds 95 —an example of such an entity could be a third-party
cafeteria contractor hired by a private religious school that participates in the
free or reduced-cost school lunch program. These religious interest groups
may then argue that private religious schools that forego federal programs
and tax exemptions—but have otherwise inclined parent entities—should
benefit from this “mere economic beneficiary” limitation on the scope of the
Rehab Act. But this reasoning is flawed, as the members of any parentsubsidiary relationship, regardless of the level of control involved, naturally
pursue shared objectives and behave in a mutually beneficial manner, so their
finances should be jointly assessed for Rehab Act purposes.96 Accordingly,
any federal financial assistance received by private religious schools’ parent

92
See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 562–64 (1984) (explaining that schools that receive
“indirect” federal financial assistance are nevertheless “recipients” thereof); U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 607 (1986) (explaining that entities that receive federal aid via
intermediaries are indirect federal financial assistance recipients).
93
The “corporate veil” refers to the fact that formation of a corporation, LLC, or other like entity
shields its shareholders or owners from liability for debts held, and wrongs committed, by the corporate
entity. At any rate:

[T]here is [a] . . . fundamental principle of corporate law, applicable to the parent-subsidiary
relationship as well as generally, that the corporate veil [i.e., liability shield] may be pierced and
the shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct when, inter alia, the corporate form
would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the
shareholder’s behalf.
United States. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62 (1998).
94
See Dingle, supra note 8.
95
See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 468 (1999).
96
Proceedings Fourth Annual International Business Law Symposium: Multinational Corporations
and Cross Border Conflicts: Nationality, Veil Piercing, and Successor Liability, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 221,
256 (1995) (“The parent and the subsidiary collectively are the business; they collectively conduct the
business under the control of the parent.”); accord Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1074 (9th Cir.
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir.
2001)) (“A parent corporation may be directly involved in financing and macro-management of its
subsidiaries . . . .”).
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entities should be imputed to the schools themselves when courts ascertain
the schools’ Rehab Act obligations.97
3. The Problem of Unjust School Cost-Shifting to Families
The Rehab Act’s effectiveness also turns on who pays for disabled
students’ reasonable accommodations. According to a Rehab Act regulation,
all private religious schools can charge disabled students more if reasonable
accommodations result in “substantial increases in cost” for the school.98 By
its terms, this regulation allows private religious schools that are so inclined
to pass the cost of reasonable accommodations to disabled students. And
lawyers for private religious schools have hinted at a preference that families
bear at least some of the cost of reasonable disability accommodations.99
Such an inclination toward cost-shifting risks placing the First Amendment
right to choose a religious education beyond the financial reach of many
disabled students. The $114,000 in loans that Michael Argenyi took out to
subsidize reasonable accommodations for two years of medical school aptly
illustrate this point.100
Since the cost of reasonable accommodations may cause sticker shock,
private religious schools may insist the “substantial increases in cost” test
turns on the raw dollar value of such accommodations. But, in the interest of
maximizing disabled students’ First Amendment right to choose a religious
education, this narrow conceptualization of “substantial increases in cost”
should be rejected in favor of a proposed proportionality test that evaluates
the relative effect of reasonable accommodations on a private religious
school’s assets. The first step in this proposed test would be to examine a
private religious school’s latest publicly available IRS Form 990,101 or the
applicable equivalent, to ascertain its annual cash surplus, or the difference
between revenue and expenses for that year.102 The second step in this test
would be to divide the raw dollar value of a disabled student’s reasonable
97
Cf. Cnty. of Genesee v. Greenstone Farm Credit Servs., ACA, 968 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863–67 (E.D.
Mich. 2013) (explaining that any tax status held by a parent or subsidiary entity can be imputed to any
relevant related entities for purposes of obligations under federal law).
98
34 C.F.R. § 104.39(b) (2020).
99
See Liekweg, supra note 55, at 100. Here, a lawyer who represented the interests of private
Catholic schools stated that the Rehab Act likely requires “accommodating parentally-compensated sign
interpreters for students with hearing deficiencies.” Id. (emphasis added). This remark aptly illustrates
the fact that some private religious schools might seek reimbursement for reasonable accommodations.
100
Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2013).
101
See generally Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (2020),
IRS (2020), https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i990 [https://perma.cc/27E2-MW84] (explaining the
purpose of Form 990).
102
All tax-exempt organizations must file annual Form 990 returns. Annual Filing and Forms, IRS
(2020), https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/annual-filing-and-forms [https://perma.cc/C9UL-X6
XC].
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accommodations by the private religious school’s annual cash surplus. The
resulting percentage would indicate whether the private religious school can
afford the reasonable accommodations at issue.103
This proportionality test could also be easily adjusted in cases where a
private religious school’s latest IRS Form 990 is not reflective of its actual
ability to afford reasonable accommodations for its disabled students. A
school could bring in little to no revenue, or sustain losses, but hold
substantial liquid assets, like cash and stock in publicly traded companies.104
Courts could respond by basing the reasonable accommodation affordability
calculation on the amount of liquid assets listed on the school’s Form 990.
A school could also incur an unusually high amount of expenses in a given
year. Under such circumstances, courts could simply perform the reasonable
accommodation affordability calculation for each year within a three-to-fiveyear range. This multi-year range would help draw a more accurate picture
of a private religious school’s finances and therefore make it more difficult
to circumvent the proportionality test by manipulating one year of their
finances. Courts could then aggregate the results to ascertain whether the
school can actually afford to accommodate a disabled student. The inherent
flexibility of this test will help prevent private religious schools that are so
inclined from manipulating their finances in a way that enables them to avoid
funding accommodations. And this test would also prevent affluent schools
from unjustly shifting costs to students with disabilities while also protecting
their less wealthy peers whose economic survival might be threatened by
expenses related to reasonable accommodation.
In promulgating the regulation that allows private schools to charge
disabled students for their reasonable accommodations, the Department of
Education could have set a fixed cost threshold for reimbursement. It instead
opted for flexible “substantial increase in cost” language.105 This phrasing
strongly implies that private religious schools’ obligation to fund reasonable
accommodations is a contextual inquiry in which the costs of any such
accommodations are evaluated in light of the school’s wealth and the money
the government contributes to the school through tax exemptions. To this
point, reasonable accommodations cause “substantial increases in cost” only
if the potential expenditures, measured as a percentage of the private

103
See Schwarz v. Villages Charter Sch., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1209 (M.D. Fla. 2016)
(exploring the idea of weighing the relative cost of reasonable accommodations “in light of the overall
financial position of the covered entity”).
104
Liquid assets consist of cash and property, such as shares in publicly traded companies, that can
readily be converted to cash with little to no loss in value. See James Chen, Liquid Asset, INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidasset.asp [https://perma.cc/7ZVS-TYXH].
105
34 C.F.R. § 104.39(b) (2020).
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religious school’s cash surplus or its other relevant assets, are so high that
the school might be willing to abandon its tax-exempt status to avoid paying
for the accommodations at issue. And this proportionality test would strike
the appropriate balance between disabled students’ First Amendment right
to choose a religious education and the economic health of private religious
schools that offer such instruction.
Real-world application of the proportionality test is instructive. Michael
Argenyi provides a useful test case as the approximate cost of his cued
speech interpreter and CART services—$57,000 per year—is known.106 This
cost can be reconciled against the 2017 IRS Form 990s filed by four private
religious schools in various financial situations. First, Covenant Academy in
Cypress, Texas reported an annual loss of $108,391 in 2017.107 As a result,
$57,000 in reasonable accommodations could be a “substantial increase in
cost” since these expenses would cause Covenant to lose even more money.
Second, consider Legacy Preparatory Christian Academy in The Woodlands,
Texas, which reported a $48,599 annual cash surplus in 2017.108 Because
$57,000 in reasonable accommodation costs would absorb Legacy Prep’s
entire 2017 annual cash surplus and cause it to lose some money that year, a
“substantial increase in cost” could exist here. Third, the Providence
Christian School of Texas in North Dallas reported an annual cash surplus
of $926,113 in 2017.109 Since $57,000 in reasonable accommodations would
consume a mere 6.15% of Providence’s 2017 annual cash surplus, leaving it
$869,113 for other uses, it is likely that no “substantial increase in cost” to
the school would result. Fourth, Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska
disclosed a $91,130,471 annual cash surplus in 2017.110 The fact that $57,000
in reasonable accommodations would take up a tiny 0.06% of Creighton’s
2017 annual cash surplus, leaving over $91 million intact, establishes that no
“substantial increase in cost” would exist here.
The above discussion raises several points. Initially, funding reasonable
accommodations is not necessarily an all-or-nothing proposition. Disabled
106

Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 2013).
See Covenant Acad., Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, IRS (2017),
https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/300152850_201806_990_2019060416376611.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7PWS-SDAA].
108
See Legacy Preparatory Christian Acad., Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax, IRS (2017), https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/202693047_201806_990_2019051616309382
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLA4-7XKY].
109
See Providence Christian Sch. of Tex., Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax, IRS (2017), https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/752247092_201805_990_2019030816158492
.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4ES-RBZN].
110
See Creighton Univ., Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, IRS (2017),
https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/470376583_201806_990_2019060716394992.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26WZ-SKRG].
107
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students can execute cost-sharing agreements with their private religious
schools, which should seek reimbursement only to the extent that a student’s
reasonable accommodations truly impose “substantial increases in cost” on
the school. This is a contextual test that reconciles expenses for reasonable
accommodations against the funds the federal government contributes to a
private religious school through tax exemptions and the school’s wealth,111
which makes sense because tax exemptions are meant to facilitate essential
public benefits112 such as reasonable accommodations for disabled students.
And that limitation on reimbursement for reasonable accommodations will
protect disabled students’ First Amendment right to choose to attend the
private religious school of their choice by eliminating potential financial
barriers to enrollment.
C. First Amendment Grounds for Extending the Rehab Act
Private religious schools will likely oppose defining tax-exempt status
and the government aid received by their parent entities as “federal financial
assistance” in Rehab Act contexts. The proportionality test for “substantial
increases in cost” will probably face similar resistance. Here, private
religious schools will likely recycle their arguments against the ADA and
claim that the application of the Rehab Act infringes on their First
Amendment right to freely exercise their religion.113 But this reasoning is
problematic for several reasons. First, subjecting tax-exempt private
religious schools114 to the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation mandate
is not a violation of the First Amendment. This is a neutral and generally
applicable interpretation of the law that will not burden religion in advancing
a vital government interest in the least restrictive way possible. Second,
arguments based on the quasi-First Amendment academic freedom doctrine
will fail as its relevant aspects deal with unrelated pedagogical concerns.
Third, requiring tax-exempt private religious schools to adhere to the Rehab
Act will protect disabled students’ First Amendment right to choose a
111

Whether accommodations are “undue hardships” under the Rehab Act is also a fact-specific
question that turns on the circumstances of each case. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d
131, 139 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that “undue hardship” does not require that employers “be driven to
the brink of insolvency” but calls for a cost–benefit analysis).
112
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (illustrating that tax exemptions can
be used to further federal objectives such as elimination of racial discrimination).
113
See Dingle, supra note 8; accord Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171, 186–90 (2012) (illustrating that the ministerial exception which allows private religious
schools to sidestep the ADA’s employment discrimination provisions is rooted in arguments centered on
such schools’ ability to freely exercise their religion).
114
For purposes of this Section, the “tax-exempt private religious schools” term includes schools
whose parent entities receive federal financial assistance, as this Essay argues that these funds should be
imputed to the private religious school for Rehab Act purposes.
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religious education by increasing access to accommodations at private
religious schools. Fourth, the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)115 does not foreclose this expansive application of the Rehab Act.
1. Religious Schools and Their First Amendment Rights
Neutral and generally applicable interpretations of federal laws, such as
subjecting tax-exempt private religious schools to the Rehab Act and its
reasonable accommodation rule, do not offend the Free Exercise Clause.
Statutes and related doctrines are neutral and generally applicable unless they
restrict practices because they are driven by religion or otherwise treat
sectarian groups worse than secular equivalents. 116 This issue requires both
facial and as-applied analyses.117 The Rehab Act is a facially neutral law as
it does not contain any language that could be read as targeting religion.118
And there is nothing inherently religious about requiring all recipients of
federal financial assistance, including tax-exempt private religious schools,
to reasonably accommodate disabled students. Also, it cannot be argued that
extending the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation mandate to taxexempt private religious schools will treat sectarian schools worse than their
secular counterparts. If anything, this use of the Rehab Act will impose upon
private religious and secular schools an identical obligation to provide
reasonable accommodations for their disabled students. Thus, the First
Amendment permits extension of the neutral and generally applicable Rehab
Act to tax-exempt private religious schools.
Besides, subjecting tax-exempt private religious schools to the Rehab
Act and its reasonable accommodation mandate will not burden religion in
violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Religion is burdened when one must
choose between following religious doctrine and securing federal benefits.119
Under the Rehab Act, tax-exempt private religious schools will only need to
decide whether to reasonably accommodate their disabled students or pay
taxes, and these options do not endanger religious precepts in violation of

115

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4.
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–33 (1993).
117
Id. at 533–35; see also Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020)
(granting injunctive relief to a church from COVID-19 regulations because they “single out houses of
worship”).
118
29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797b; cf. Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533–35 (disapproving of an ordinance’s
use of words relevant to Santeria that targeted that particular religion).
119
See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–24 (2017)
(quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (plurality opinion)) (alterations and emphasis in
original) (“‘To condition the availability of benefits . . . upon [a recipient’s] willingness to . . . surrender[]
his religiously impelled [status] effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional liberties.’ . . .
In this case, there is no dispute that Trinity Lutheran is put to the choice between being a church and
receiving a government benefit. The rule is simple: No churches need apply.”).
116
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the First Amendment.120 Large-print papers, sign language interpreters, and
handicapped-accessible buildings for disabled students will not materially
alter religious messaging or hamper rituals like Communion. In Rehab Act
contexts, “[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact
on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those
schools from observing their religious tenets.”121 Since religion will not be
burdened, requiring all tax-exempt private religious schools to reasonably
accommodate disabled students under the Rehab Act will not offend these
schools’ Free Exercise Clause rights.122
In response, private religious schools might contend that using their taxexempt status to subject them to the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation
requirement would “burden” religion by decreasing the cash available for
religious activities. It is true that a tax-exempt private religious school might
pay for reasonable accommodations under the Rehab Act. Yet every secular
expenditure that is incurred by a tax-exempt private religious school, such as
the payment of minimum wage in accordance with federal law,123 necessarily
reduces the funds that are available for its religious activities. Tax-exempt
private religious schools’ general obligation to pay for goods and services
does not burden religion. For the same reason, private religious schools that
relinquish their tax-exempt status to sidestep the Rehab Act will fare no
better if they rely on the argument that general taxation burdens religion by
shrinking the pot of money that the school can use for religious purposes.
The Supreme Court has expressly held that, “to the extent that imposition of
a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount of money [which a
private religious school] has to spend on its religious activities, any such
burden is not constitutionally significant.”124
Further, to the extent that requiring tax-exempt private religious schools
to reasonably accommodate disabled students burdens religion, any such
burden will help advance the federal government’s compelling interest in
ending ableism by the least restrictive means possible.125 “[D]isabilities do
120
Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15, 24–25 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that a
church’s choice between lobbying or paying taxes did not burden religion as that choice was not
inherently religious).
121
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983).
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See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (explaining that a law that burdens religion
forces religious people to choose between their religion and something like employment).
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See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1401 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that
private church-operated schools are subject to the minimum wage requirements set out in the Fair Labor
Standards Act and affirming an award of back pay).
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Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990).
125
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993)
(explaining that any law that is not neutral or generally applicable must be justified by a “compelling
governmental interest”).
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not diminish the right to full inclusion in American society.”126 The ADA and
Rehab Act are congressional mandates to eliminate discrimination against
individuals with a mental or physical disability.127 Both statutes safeguard
the fundamental right of disabled persons to fully participate in modern
society, and “target the same ‘critical areas’ where discrimination persists,
including education.”128 And the ADA and Rehab Act both address ableism
in education by requiring schools to reasonably accommodate disabled
students. 129 These statutes clarify that Congress views the prevention of
discrimination against disabled students via reasonable accommodations as
a compelling government interest. 130 In addition, the Supreme Court has
ruled that tying tax exemptions for private religious schools to nonreligious
federal civil rights initiatives is the least restrictive way to further the
government interest in terminating discrimination that contravenes public
policy.131 Any burden that may be imposed by requiring private religious
schools to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled students will
therefore be justified by the federal government’s compelling interest to
eradicate ableism in educational contexts.
2. Religious Schools and Academic Freedom
The First Amendment also implicates academic freedom, which
encompasses “‘the four essential freedoms’ of a [school]—to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”132 Some tax-exempt private
religious schools might take the position that the Rehab Act’s reasonable
accommodation rule will infringe upon their academic freedom by dictating
how students are taught and altering the composition of their student body to
include more disabled pupils.
A hypothetical “how it shall be taught” academic freedom argument
against application of the Rehab Act and its reasonable accommodation
requirement to tax-exempt private religious schools has its flaws. The “how
it shall be taught” aspect of academic freedom encompasses a school’s right
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to decide the substantive content of its instructional materials,133 set uniform
class grading policies, 134 and manage other curriculum-related matters. 135
These purely pedagogical concerns are unaffected by neutral and generally
applicable laws, such as the Rehab Act, that do not impact school curricula.
Besides, a private religious school’s autonomy in academic curriculum
matters would not be constrained by an independent obligation to reasonably
accommodate disabled students.
Likewise, a possible “who may be admitted to study” academic freedom
argument against extending the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation
requirement to all tax-exempt private religious schools is inapplicable in this
case. This element of academic freedom is immaterial because it pertains to
the admissions process, as opposed to postadmission responsibilities.136 If
anything, this “who may be admitted to study” academic freedom analysis is
in tension with a Rehab Act regulation that bars private schools from denying
students admission on the basis of a disability.137
To the above point, academic freedom is constrained by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Academic freedom thus allows schools to admit students based
on race to promote racial diversity138 but does not operate in a manner that
allows admissions preferences designed to achieve other objectives such as
exclusion of disabled students based on the perceived cost of their reasonable
accommodations. And no court has decided that schools can use academicfreedom doctrine to discriminate against their disabled applicants. For these
reasons, tax-exempt private religious schools cannot use academic freedom
to sidestep the Rehab Act’s substantive requirements by disfavoring disabled
133
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applicants (and their potentially expensive reasonable accommodations) in
the admissions process.
3. Disabled Students and Their First Amendment Rights
Applying the Rehab Act to tax-exempt private religious schools would
help disabled students enjoy their First Amendment right to choose religious
education. Disabilities do not limit constitutional rights, and handicapped
individuals are thus entitled to complete inclusion in society.139 This right to
full participation in society encompasses the right to choose to attend private
religious schools, which are the only realistic means of enjoying one’s Free
Exercise Clause right to sectarian instruction.140 Extending the Rehab Act to
tax-exempt private religious schools will make it easier for disabled students
to exercise their First Amendment right to choose a sectarian education by
improving the availability of reasonable accommodations at such schools.
Disabled students will otherwise have less access to religious instruction than
their nonhandicapped peers, thus perpetuating a state of affairs in which
disabled students can exercise their First Amendment rights to a lesser extent
than nondisabled pupils. And placing tax-exempt private religious schools
beyond the reach of the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation rule may
improperly allow schools’ economic interests to constrain disabled students’
First Amendment rights.
4. Support from RFRA
Lastly, tax-exempt private religious schools may make an argument that
RFRA shields them from the Rehab Act and its reasonable accommodation
requirement. By its terms, RFRA applies to all federal statutory and common
law, and the implementation of that law.141 It implicates the First Amendment
in the sense that it specifies that neutral and generally applicable federal laws
may not burden religion unless doing so will advance some compelling
governmental interest by the least restrictive means available.142 Schools that
seek protection under RFRA must establish that the federal law at issue
materially interferes with the free exercise of religion.143 If so, the opposing
party, such as a disabled student seeking accommodations, must show that
139
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the relevant burden on religion furthers a fundamental government interest
by the least restrictive method possible.144
A RFRA challenge to an interpretation of the Rehab Act which obliges
tax-exempt private religious schools to reasonably accommodate disabled
students would initially posit that this application of the law materially
burdens such schools’ freedom to exercise their religion. But this reasoning
has its flaws. The Supreme Court has held that religion is not burdened when
tax-exempt status is conditioned on acceptance of nonsectarian civil rights
initiatives.145 As such, tax-exempt private religious schools that try to evade
the civil rights initiatives built into the Rehab Act by invoking RFRA will
most likely be unable to satisfy RFRA’s threshold requirement146 of material
government interference with the free exercise of their religion. And even if
the Rehab Act burdens religion, subjecting all tax-exempt private religious
schools to the reasonable accommodation mandate would advance the
compelling government interest in ending educational ableism in the least
restrictive means possible. The government also has an “‘interest in
maintaining a sound tax system,’ free of ‘myriad exceptions flowing from a
wide variety of religious beliefs.’”147 Uniform application of the Rehab Act’s
reasonable accommodation rule to all tax-exempt private schools, including
those that are religious in nature, is the least restrictive way of furthering this
interest in an equitable and functional tax system.
D. Policy Considerations: Preventing Federal Entanglement in Disability
Discrimination
Beyond the foregoing constitutional and statutory issues, a key policy
consideration favors extending the Rehab Act to tax-exempt private religious
schools: avoiding federal entanglement in discrimination that contravenes
public policy. The federal government has a compelling interest in erasing
ableism in education contexts.148 And since tax exemptions cannot support
discriminatory behavior,149 private religious schools should not be excused
from the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation rule. Freeing tax-exempt
private religious schools of the Rehab Act’s reasonable accommodation rule
144
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would turn the federal government into an indirect supporter, through tax
exemptions, of the disability discrimination that Congress tried to reduce by
enacting that statute.150
IV. AMENDING THE ADA AND THE REHAB ACT
If federal courts prove unwilling to extend the Rehab Act and its
reasonable accommodation mandate to tax-exempt private religious schools,
some small changes to the ADA and the Rehab Act will help ensure that such
schools reasonably accommodate their disabled students. First, as discussed
in this Essay, Congress should augment the Rehab Act by recognizing taxexempt status as federal financial assistance, imputing federal financial
assistance received by the parent entities of private religious schools to such
schools, and adopting the proportionality ability-to-pay test for identification
of “substantial increases in cost” that enable schools to seek reimbursement
for reasonable accommodations from their disabled students. Second,
Congress should pass another Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act-style bill that remedies gaps in current ADA jurisprudence.151 This new
amendment would repeal the religious exemption enumerated in Title III of
the ADA on grounds that, as shown above, a legal obligation to reasonably
accommodate disabled students will not burden religion. And Free Exercise
Clause arguments against Title III of the ADA may indeed be motivated not
by religious concerns but by sectarian schools’ reluctance to fund reasonable
accommodations for the disabled.152 Such selective tightening of religious
schools’ purse strings is not a valid basis for immunity from ADA Title III
and its reasonable accommodation mandate.
CONCLUSION
The religious exemption codified in Title III of the ADA gives some
private religious schools the impression that they can refuse to reasonably
accommodate their disabled students, and some of these schools do adopt
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such an approach to handicapped pupils.153 Such unwillingness to provide
reasonable accommodations may force disabled students to locate a more
welcoming educational environment elsewhere.154 Thus, disabled students
cannot enjoy their Free Exercise Clause right to seek a religious education to
the same extent as their nonhandicapped peers. This state of affairs must
change; individuals do not lose their constitutional rights just because they
happen to have a disability.
The solution to this problem may be fairly simple. Subjecting private
religious schools that either hold tax-exempt status or have parent entities
that receive federal financial assistance to the Rehab Act will substantially
improve disabled students’ access to reasonable accommodations at such
schools.155 Disabled students will gain further protection from discrimination
if tax-exempt private religious schools’ right to seek reimbursement for
reasonable accommodations pursuant to the Rehab Act turns on the school’s
inability to afford such modifications. This expansive interpretation of the
Rehab Act will substantially safeguard disabled students’ constitutional right
to choose to attend the private religious school of their choice without either
infringing on these schools’ First Amendment rights to freely exercise their
religion or running afoul of RFRA.
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